THE PRESIDENT AND THE AUTOPEN: IT IS UNCONSITUTIONAL FOR SOMEONE OR SOMETHING TO SIGN A BILL OUTSIDE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENCE TERRY L. TURNIPSEED *
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way … 1 ABSTRACT On May 26, 2011, only hours before three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act were scheduled to expire, Congress passed an extension. For days, the White House had someone ready to fly to Europe with the legislation in hand for the President to sign, but Congress had been tardy. It seemed quite important to the White House that none of these provisions lapse for any length of time, even the relatively short time it would take to fly from Washington to France. With this urgency as a backdrop, the President was awakened at 5:45 a.m. Central European Time so he could authorize a first: phone a White House staffer in Washington, D.C., and instruct him to use an autopen to sign the bill. No President had ever had anyone else sign on his behalf, and certainly no President had ever ordered the use of an autopen to inscribe his signature on a bill when away from the White House.
This Article explores multiple facets of the President's use of a proxy signature to sign legislation.
The state of the law surrounding proxy signatures has remained amazingly constant through both English and American history. The proxy and the principal must be present together when a proxy signature is utilized
INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2011, only hours before three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") were scheduled to expire, Congress passed an extension.
2 For days, the White House had someone ready to fly to Europe with the legislation in hand for the President to sign, but Congress had been tardy. 3 It seemed quite important to the White House that none of these provisions lapse for any length of time, even the relatively short time it would take to fly from Washington to France. 4 With this urgency as a backdrop, the President was awakened at 5:45 a.m. Central European Time so he could authorize a first: phone a White House staffer in Washington, D.C., and instruct him to use an autopen to sign the bill. No President had ever had anyone else sign on his behalf, and certainly no President had ever ordered the use of an autopen 5 to inscribe his signature on a bill when away from the White House. The use of the autopen was quite a radical departure from the norm.
This Article explores multiple facets of the President's use of a proxy signature to sign legislation. In particular, the house-of-cards 2005 Office of Legal Counsel's memorandum to President George W. Bush making the legal case for the use of a non-presence proxy to sign bills (the "Nielson Memorandum") 6 will be critiqued. It is worth noting that despite this opinion President Bush never utilized a proxy to sign a bill. 7 In 2005, in fact, President Bush flew through the night to get to the White House in time to sign the Terri Schiavo bill. 8 This practice continued into President Obama's tenure, including a December 2010 hurried flight by a White House staffer to Hawaii, where the President was vacationing, to obtain the President's in-person signature on the September 11 th responders bill. 9 The use of the autopen to sign a bill into law brought swift criticism from 21 House members in the form of a strongly-worded letter to the President that reiterated the multiple dissenting opinions detailed in the Nielson Memorandum. 10 It has also produced some good-natured humor. Mr. President, it is clear that assigning a surrogate the responsibility of signing bills passed by Congress is a debatable issue, and could be challenged in court. That being the case, our request is that, out of an abundance of caution, you affix your signature to S. 990 by personally re-signing the enrolled bill. We recall you retaking the Oath of Office on January 21, 2009, over similar concerns for adhering to the Constitution, and believe your signing legislation passed by the United States Congress is of equal importance. Furthermore, we ask that you commit to ending the practice of using an auto pen to sign bills passed by Congress.
Thank you for your consideration of this matter. We look forward to your response. Note that the letter calls for President Obama to sign the legislation now. Of course this would have no effect since the bill is already a law due to the passage of the ten-day period (excluding Sundays), with that period ending at a time when Congress was in session. There was, however, a twelve-day period when neither the old FISA provisions nor the renewed provisions were in force. See infra Part IV. 11 See, e.g., Republicans Urge Autopen to Consider Presidential Campaign, The Huffington Post (May 28, 2011) (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-ritz/obamaautopen-_b_868371.html):
In Part I, this Article details the constitutional underpinnings of the Presidential signature requirement. Part II of this Article discusses the origins of proxy signatures, and in particular the associated presence requirement for proxy signatures. The origins date back to the Statute of Frauds and then the Statute of Wills. As the starting point for analysis of proxy signatures generally, the longstanding and extensive body of law associated with proxy signatures for wills is the most important lens to view the requirements for Presidential proxy signatures. Part II, then, explores in detail the law of will proxy signatures that forms the bedrock of interpreting the Article I §7 Presidential signature requirement. Part III critiques the Nielson Memorandum's treatment of the presence requirement for proxy signatures. This critique includes a look at the Nielson Memorandum's cites to the lessons of will executions that require the proxy to be present, though the memorandum ignores these same lessons in a shoddy attempt to explain away the presence requirement in a footnote. Part IV examines potential negative consequences that could flow from a void Presidential signature on a bill. Finally, Part V concludes.
The recent focus on the Autopen now has Republicans developing a new game plan for the 2012 election. With their field of viable prospective presidential candidates rapidly shrinking, many Republican insiders have quietly begun urging the Autopen to mount a bid for the GOP Presidential nomination to unseat President Obama. Despite having never itself served as an elected representative, the autopen has worked under nearly every politician in the United States since 1946, signing countless letters to constituents and prospective political supporters. The Autopen, they say, is uniquely qualified to run a strong campaign and already has a leg up on a majority of the declared contenders.
"Mr. Pen already has more experience in government than Herman Cain, who himself is inexplicably polling at 8 percent of Republican primary voters," said conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer. "Unlike Newt Gingrich, it doesn't have problems keeping its message consistent, and although it may not have the people skills that Mr. Obama possesses, its charisma far exceeds that of Tim Pawlenty." "The Autopen is the best serious candidate we can come up with now that both Governors Chris Christie and Mitch Daniels have declined to run," says a Republican National Committee member who asked to speak off the record. He observed that the Autopen has quickly gained support among establishment Republican officials afraid that the renewed prospect of a Palin run could sink their chances of retaking the White House. "The fact is, Governor Palin just doesn't have the intellectual curiosity that the Autopen possesses. Most of us have personally worked with both Ms. Palin and the Autopen and we all believe that when it comes time to make the hard decisions and answer the tough questions, Sarah Palin cannot match the Autopen's skills."
In sum, the President's use of the autopen (or even a human being) to sign a bill outside of the President's presence is unconstitutional. 12 This establishes a dangerous precedent, one which every thinking lawyer in Washington politics seemed to have overlooked.
I. The Constitution
The Supreme Court has not extensively considered the fundamental significance of the President's signature under Article 1, §7 clause 2. 13 It is hard to believe that, after more than two hundred years of constitutional construction, an act so essential to one of the most routine functions of government, lawmaking, has escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts. This is, perhaps, because it has long been taken for granted that the President's signature is more than a perfunctory mark of approval. As discussed in the introduction above, President Obama's use of the autopen to renew three provisions of FISA in absentia is without precedent in American history. But it is not the President's use of the autopen that is problematic. Rather, the President's absence during the proxy signing is, and it demands an examination of the very nature of the Constitution's signature requirement. him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
It thus establishes three means by which a bill can become a law: (1) by the signature of the President; (2) by supermajority, and; (3) by the lapse of ten days (excluding Sundays) from presentment (assuming Congress is in session for the period), absent a veto and absent the signature of the President. 14 The debates on the Constitution provide indispensable guidance on the principles informing the signature requirement. 15 Alexander Hamilton himself noted, "There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of [the Constitution] than [the Executive]". 16 The Supreme Court recently agreed, noting,
[t]he procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure. In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood. 16 The original lawmaking procedure considered by the Constitutional Convention contained no signature requirement at all. But then again, it also envisioned a decidedly weak Executive.
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The Randolph Propositions, which were the starting point for the Constitutional Convention, 19 vested the power to make law in Congress, but conferred a veto power on a Council of Revision composed of the Executive (not yet defined as a unitary institution) "and a convenient number of the National Judiciary". 20 But as successive drafts of the Constitution circulated, the signature requirement emerged in close connection with the development of the separation of powers doctrine. As James Madison explained to Convention delegates, If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl[ative,] Execut[ive,] and Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation that they should be made independent of each other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a reappointment. . . In like manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. . . . . Experience had proved a tendency in our [state] governments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. 21 As the Convention began to debate an affirmative role for the Executive in the legislative process, a role that would make it more than a mere cypher of the Legislature, two versions of what would become Art. I, §7 circulated among the delegates. The first, put forward for consideration on August 6 th 1786, stipulated:
Every bill, which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider that bill. . . Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United States, and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each. If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively signify their approbation by signing it; but if, upon such revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the objections against it, to that house, in which it shall have originated. . . 23 Although the composition of the executive is different in each draft, early formulations of the presentment and signature requirements of Art. I, §7 appear in each. Moreover, the signature requirements in each draft share a common purpose: the President's signature is to serve as a formal act signifying the approval of the Executive.
The signature requirement can also be understood as a safeguard against the abuse of executive power. As James Iredell, leader of the North Carolina Federalists and future justice of the Supreme Court, explained, "the President must be personally responsible for every thing (emphasis in original)." 24 A necessary means of ensuring such accountability was that all 22 Id. at 388-89. 23 important advice and decisions be reduced to writing. 25 Iredell's discussion of the role of the President's advisors is particularly illuminating in this respect:
[The President] is not to be assisted by a Council, summoned to a jovial dinner perhaps, and giving their opinions according to the nod of the President-but the opinion is to be given with the utmost solemnity, in writing. No after equivocation can explain it away. It must for ever after speak for itself, and commit the character of the writer, in lasting colours either of fame or infamy, or neutral significance, to future ages, as well as the present (emphasis in original).
Note that the writing requirement has two attributes: first, it must be public, and second, the writing is imputed to the writer himself. In this manner, Iredell explained, "the President who acts should be responsible for his conduct, following advice at his peril, than that there should be a danger of punishing any man for an erroneous opinion which might possibly be sincere (emphasis in original)." 26 Both the Constitution as ratified and its early drafts treat the acts of approval and signature as separate and distinct from one another. However, for a bill to become law by approval of the President, the President's signature is essential. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in La Abra when it explained, It has properly been the practice of the President to inform Congress by message of his approval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in order that a bill may become law by the approval of the President is that it be signed within the prescribed time after being presented to him. 27 If Presidential approval alone were enough to turn a bill into a law, it would be sufficient for the President to inform Congress of his consent for the record. The President's signature alone authoritatively communicates his approbation. Thus it is only by signing a bill that the President can turn it into a law. 28 Since it is the President's signature, and not his mere approval, that gives a bill the force of law, it is puzzling that the Nielson Memorandum and a 2011 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on electronic presentment 29 characterize the act of signature as a ministerial function on the part of the President. The Supreme Court has explained, "[a] ministerial duty. . . is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law."
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The President's duty of signature is indeed imposed by law -by the Constitution of the United States, no less -but it cannot possibly be characterized as a duty that leaves nothing to discretion. While the President's approbation of a bill and his signature thereof are separate acts, only the President's signature gives effect to his approbation. Not just any expression of approbation will do when it comes to the enactment by the President of a law. 31 Thus the Cedarbaum Memorandum was only half correct in noting that signature "is an external manifestation of internal assent, and Article I, Section 7 plainly requires the outward manifestation in addition to the internal assent when it states: 'If [the President] approve [a bill] he shall sign it.'" 32 But as La Abra established, because the President's approbation is meaningless absent his signature, it is not quite so easy to separate the discretionary from ministerial elements from the act of signing a bill.
This may, of course, be why over the course of more than two hundred years, at no time has a proxy signature been utilized to sign a bill into law until President Obama attempted to do so in May 2011.
II. The Presence Requirement for Proxy Signatures
The presence requirement for proxy signatures first appears in the Statute of Frauds of 1677, whose purpose was the "prevention of many fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury". The exact text is as follows (spelling modernized):
As one scholar put it, "[t]he Constitution presents the President with two basic choices: to sign or veto a bill. While the Constitution does mention the possibility of the President not signing a bill, it does so not to give the President an opportunity to avoid taking responsibility for a bill, but instead to specify the legal effects of the President failing, due to oversight or intention, to exercise his powers under the Constitution." Michael B. This very large, very developed and time-honored body of law -the law of wills -is the appropriate lens in which to view the requirements for a valid proxy signature. The Nielson Memorandum recognizes this implicitly in its heavy reliance on the law of wills to legitimize proxy signatures.
This presence requirement for proxy signatures endures to modern times. The Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") § 2-502, for example, requires the following:
(a) [ An attested] will must be:
(1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence (emphasis added) and by the testator's direction; and (3) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he [or she] witnessed either the signing of the will as described in paragraph (2) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will. 35 Oddly, all the cases cited in the comment to UPC § 2-502 concern the presence of witnesses to the signature of the will and not the presence of the testator herself when someone signs on her behalf at her instruction. Under subsection (a)(2), the testator must sign the will or some other individual must sign the testator's name in the testator's presence and by the testator's direction. If the latter procedure is followed, and someone else signs the testator's name, the so-called "conscious presence" test is codified, under which a signing is sufficient if it was done in the testator's conscious presence, i.e., within the range of the testator's senses such as hearing; the signing need not have occurred within the testator's line of sight. presence requirement for a proxy signature is so unequivocally accepted in the law of wills 37 that it is not litigated very much. This is borne out by the scarcity of case law. Nevertheless, the test for the presence requirement ("conscious presence") is the same for each, so looking at the purpose of the presence requirement for witnesses is instructive. For example, one court explained the purpose of the presence requirement (as far as witnesses are concerned) as follows: "The object of the provision of the statute that the witnesses shall sign in the presence of the testator, is to prevent substitution and fraud upon him."
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The Restatement also requires the presence of the proxy. (1910) , the Supreme Court of Mississippi had to consider whether a will executed by an illiterate man was valid. The testator had someone else write the will. The testator then had a witness read the document to him and sign the testator's name to it. The issue before the court, however, was not whether the proxy's signature was valid in light of the testator's inability to read the will, but rather whether the witnesses' signatures were valid. That is, the court took it as a given that even an illiterate could authorize a proxy's signature as long as that proxy was in the presence of the testator. See also Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688 (1903) ("Any signature or mark signed by the testator, or by another in his presence and at his express direction, to the will, as and for his completed signature, and acknowledged and adopted by him as such at the time, in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, is a sufficient signing"). An example of the proxy presence requirement appears in a leading wills law textbook:
Arthur spent weeks drafting a complicated will for Maria, one of his most wealthy and influential clients. Arthur received a telephone call from Maria while she was in flight to Europe. She explained she was running behind schedule and was not able to make it to Arthur's office to sign the will as she had planned. She then stated, "I hereby direct you to sign my will for me." Arthur complied. Is Maria's will valid?
Explanation. Courts typically hold that the testator need not actually see the proxy make the signature. Instead, the testator must be in a position where the testator could see or make use of the testator's other senses [if, for example the testator were blind] to determine what is happening. Maria's will is unlikely to be valid because Maria could not see or use her other senses to determine whether Arthur actually signed the appropriate document. 40 The overarching aim of statutes governing the formal requirements of will execution was stated well in a New York case: "The formalities prescribed by the statute are safeguards thrown around the testator to prevent fraud and imposition." 41 Thus the challenges one sees to wills signed by proxy are not rooted in arguments about the formal signing requirements but in arguments of fraud and undue influence. 42 Avoidance of fraud, then, is consistently fixed as the purpose of the presence requirement, something that should be of the utmost importance in Presidential proxy signatures of bills into laws. Born of fraud prevention, this entire body of law has been consistent in its presence requirement, and was very well established at the time of the Constitution's ratification and beyond.
III. The Nielson Memorandum and the Presence Requirement
The Nielson Memorandum describes multiple prior legal opinions indicating that the President could not use a non-presence proxy to sign legislation. The following, taken from the House Letter, summarize these prior opinions:
• "See Rehnquist Letter at 2 (concluding that 'with the exception of signing bills passed by Congress, there is no legal impediment to the delegation of the act of signing and that the question of which documents the President should personally sign is largely one of propriety rather than of law') (emphasis added)"
• "Scalia Memorandum at 1 (citing Rehnquist Memorandum and stating that '[t]he signing of bills passed by the Congress is one exception which may require the President's personal signature') (emphasis added)"
• "Memorandum to Files from Ralph W. Tarr, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Presidential Signing of Bankruptcy Extension Act at 9-10 (June 13, 1984) ('Tarr Memorandum') ('We therefore concluded that it was necessary for the President physically to sign the bill in order for it to become a law.')"
• "Wilkey Memorandum at 10 ('a bill would seem to present an a fortiori case in which under the Constitutional provision the signification of the President's approval requires an exercise of personal discretion and therefore cannot be delegated')"
• "Rehnquist Memorandum at 2 ('the requirement for the President's signature as well as his decision approving a bill would appear to be non-delegable')"
• "Indeed, on at least two occasions, a bill was flown halfway around the world, on the advice of this Office, so that the President could personally affix his signature to it. See Tarr Memorandum at 9 (China) see also So, the Nielson Memorandum ignores the numerous prior executive branch legal opinions concluding that the President may not have a non-presence proxy sign legislation.
Incredibly, the Nielson Memorandum concedes that the bulk of prior law addressing the issue of allowing someone else to sign on behalf of another emphatically states that the person signing has to be in the presence of the principal. Indeed, not taking into account footnote 11 (to be discussed below), the Nielson Memorandum cites twenty-two sources confirming that presence is required of a proxy signature or seal! Here are the twenty-two sources:
Even where the law required authorization under seal, however, the principle of signatures permitted one validly to sign or seal a document, in the absence of such formal authorization, by directing another to affix one's name or seal to the document in one's presence. See Ball v. Dunsterville, 100 Eng. Rep. 1038, 1039, 4 Term Rep. 313, 314 (K.B. 1791) ("The Court were clearly of opinion that there was no ground for the objection; that no particular mode of delivery was necessary, for that it was sufficient if the party, executing a deed, treated it as his own. And they relied principally on this Sup. Ct. 1812) ("In the present case, one of the defendants sealed the bond, with one seal, for himself and his partner, with the consent of his partner, and after the partner had seen and approved of the bond, and while he was about the store, at the time of the execution. This evidence was sufficient to carry the cause to the jury, and to justify them in finding it the deed of both.");
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Courts based this rule on the general principle that "what a person does in the presence of another, in his name and by his direction, is the act of the latter, as if done exclusively in his own person." Kime v. Brooks, 31 N.C. 218, 220 (1848); see also Kidder v. Prescott, 24 N.H. 263 (1851) ("an act done by one in the presence and under the control of another, for that other, is regarded not as the exercise of a delegated authority, but as the personal act of the party in whose behalf it was performed"); Gardner v. Gardner, 59 Mass. 483, 484 (1850) ("The execution of the deed is objected to, on the ground, that when a deed is executed by an agent or attorney, the authority to do so must be an authority of as high a nature, derived from an instrument under the seal of the grantor. This is a good rule of law, but it does not apply to the present case. The name being written by another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and at her request, is her act."); 45 As Justice Story explained,
[A]lthough a person cannot ordinarily sign a deed for and as the agent of another, without an authority given to him under seal; yet this is true only in the absence of the principal; for if the principal is present, and verbally or impliedly authorizes the agent to fix his name to the deed, it becomes the deed of the principal; and it is deemed, to all intents and purposes, as binding upon him, as if he had personally sealed and executed it. The distinction may seem nice and refined; but it proceeds upon the ground, that where the principal is present, the act of signing and sealing is to be deemed his personal act, as much as if he held the pen, and another person guided his hand and pressed it on the seal.
Story on Agency § 51. 46
A similar principle was expressly incorporated in the provision of the Statute of Frauds governing wills, which required that "all devises and bequests of any lands . . . shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence and by his express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor by 3 or 4 credible witnesses. In addition, courts held that attesting witnesses could satisfy the statutory requirement that they "subscribe their names" to the will by directing that their signature be affixed to the will by another in their presence on the ground that, consistent with the principle of signatures, such a signing "should . . . , for every purpose contemplated by the law, be regarded as their own act, as much so as if it had been a deed to which they were subscribed, or as if their hands had been held and guided by another." Upchurch v. Upchurch, 55 Ky. 102, 113 (1855); 49 Thus, for example, in reliance on the well established rule that "the name of a party affixed to an instrument by his direction, and in his presence, is affixed by himself; whether he in fact puts his hand upon the pen or not," it was held in Hanson v. Rowe, 26 N.H. 327 (1853), that where "[t]he sign of the magistrate was placed upon the writ, by a mechanical act performed in his presence and under his immediate direction and inspection," it was "to every legal intent as much his sign manual as if his own 47 Id. 48 Id.
hand had guided the pen which traced it." Id. at 329; see also Andover v. Grafton, 7 N.H. 298, 305 (1834) ("Had the selectman who signed the note, placed with his own name that of the other selectman who authorized him to settle the account and give a note, perhaps the evidence respecting the authority might have been sufficient to have rendered it valid, as it would then have purported to carry on its face evidence that it was the act of the town, by a majority of the selectmen; but even in that case it would deserve consideration, whether authority to do this could be delegated, and whether it could be legally done unless the other selectman was present, and assenting at the time of the execution of the paper.");
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And in a somewhat later case, in a context very similar to that which we consider here, the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri held that the mayor of Kansas City could approve an ordinance passed by the city counsel by directing his secretary to affix the mayor's signature to the ordinance in his presence. Porter v. Boyd Paving & Construction Co., 214 Mo. 1 (1908). The city's charter paralleled Article I, Section 7, providing that ordinances passed by the city counsel "shall be 'presented to the mayor. If the mayor approve any ordinance he shall sign it; if not he shall return it to the city clerk with his objection, and the city clerk shall at the next session of the house in which it originated return it to such house.'" Id. at 10.; 51 Indeed, similar principles may have governed the manner in which the King of England approved bills passed by Parliament. As Blackstone explains, the King could assent to a bill either by signing it with his own hand or by directing the clerk of Parliament to manifest the King's assent in the presence of the King and Parliament. we do not believe that [the] inability of the President to delegate the decision whether to approve and sign a bill means that his presence is required when his signature is affixed to a bill he has approved and decided to sign, so long as the person affixing the President's signature to the bill has been properly and specifically authorized to perform that ministerial act. 57 Footnote 11 then attempts to justify the abandonment of the centuries-old presence requirement, claiming,: "The purpose of the presence requirement appears to have been to provide a principal with control over acts done in his name in the absence of some other valid grant of authority that would otherwise constrain his agent." 58 (This is inaccurate, of course. As this Article has clearly demonstrated, the purpose of the presence requirement is the prevention of fraud and undue influence.) The Nielson Memorandum then cherry-picks an 1848 North Carolina case in support of this proposition.
See, e.g., Kime v. Brooks, 31 N.C. 218, 220 (1848) ("what a person does in the presence of another, in his name and by his direction, is the act of the latter, as if done exclusively in his own person; but that what is done out of his presence, though by his direction and in his name, cannot in law be considered an act in propria persona, 59 but one done by authority"); id. at 221 (agent's act of signing, sealing, and delivering of deed was not in principal's physical presence and could not be said to be the principal's act 'in that he saw or knew or could know of his own knowledge, that [the agent] was in fact doing what he directed her; but it rested on his confidence, that she would pursue his directions, and in her testimony that she did pursue them').
This language barely supports the memorandum's argument, much less undermines the applicability of the presence requirement. The citation does little more than offer a crude distinction between a proxy and an agent. Footnote 11 then states:
That requirement should not apply, however, when a principal properly and specifically authorizes a subordinate to affix the principal's signature to a document. Accordingly, as noted above, the Department has properly substituted specific authorization for presence in situations where an executive officer retains the decision-making function associated with a signature requirement but directs 57 Id. 58 Id. 59 "In one's own person." Black's Law dictionary (9 th ed. 2009).
another to perform the manual act of affixing the officer's signature. 60 This bold statement runs counter to logic and counter to the body of law that has existed since the Statute of Frauds first defined a category of highvalue transactions, including the execution of wills, that would be protected from fraud by formal legal requirements. (The Nielson Memorandum uses six cites to the law of wills to support its contention that proxy signatures are allowed for Presidential signatures of legislation. Footnote 11 then ignores this body of law completely.) "Specific authorization" cannot substitute for presence. Fraud in the execution of documents can too easily occur without the presence of the principal. This requirement must be maintained for highvalue transactions both as a matter of policy and as a matter of constitutional interpretation. As to the latter, the presence requirement was firmly in place both at common law and in statutes at the time that Article I was drafted and ratified.
As further justification for the argument that presence is not required, footnote 11 cites as follows: "See, e.g., Signing Certificate Attached to Farm Loan Bonds, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 147-48; Affixing Facsimile Signatures to Orders, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 351; Wheat Memorandum at 9; Rankin Memorandum at 2-3." 61 In sum, then, the Nielson Memorandum rests its entire argument on two Attorney General opinions, one unpublished memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, and one unpublished memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel. The subjects of these opinions are signatures on certificates relating to farm loan bonds, signatures on military orders, signatures for the appointment of Postmasters (the subject of the Wheat Memorandum), and signatures for the appointment of Marshals (the subject of the Rankin Memorandum). None of the signatures discussed in these memoranda require a Presidential signature that is constitutionally mandated. The memoranda dealing with them are self-serving executive branch opinions citing no case law and positing no constitutional interpretations that would be relevant to a constitutionally-mandated Presidential signature. The Nielson Memorandum is perhaps the most selfserving of them all, as it gives shabby treatment to one of the highest-value transactions entrusted to the Executive: lawmaking itself. Footnote 11 is but a flimsy two of clubs card that is attempting to hold up the rest of the deck.
62
60 Nielson Memorandum at 20, fn 11. 61 Id. 62 Note finally that the Nielson Memorandum also makes great hay of agent/principal concepts, but an agent cannot sign high-value documents such as a will on behalf of a principal even under the broadest durable power of attorney and even in the principle's presence. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 17, cmt. b ("The making of affidavits as to knowledge and the execution of wills are illustrations of acts commonly required by statute to be done personally").
IV. Potential Consequences of Unconstitutional Non-Presence Proxy Signings
The Constitution provides:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a law." 63 It takes an affirmative veto, or the adjournment of the Congressional session before ten days (not including Sundays) elapse (a so-called "pocket veto"), to keep a bill from becoming a law.
Congress approved the extension (until June 1, 2015) of the amendments to FISA on May 26, 2011. As applied here, then, excluding Sundays, ten days later would be June 7, 2011. These three provisions originally expired at midnight on May 26, 2011. Assuming that the use of the autopen was unconstitutional and thus a void act, then it is as if the President had taken no action in the ten-day period, neither signing nor vetoing the renewal bill. Since both houses of Congress were in session in June 2011, the renewal bill has an effective date of June 8, 2011. There were, then, twelve days when neither the old provisions nor their replacements were valid.
The legislation extended by four years three sections of FISA: (1) socalled roving wiretaps; 64 (2) the library records provision (searches of business records); 65 and (3) lone wolf surveillance (individuals suspected of terrorist activities who are not known to be connected to terrorist organizations). 66 Fortunately, these provisions had grandfather clauses permitting them "to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date." 67 
